Operation Barbarossa

Operation Barbarossa was perhaps the boldest, most pushy save at the homogeneous term most foolish and ill- clipd operating theater executed by Nazi Germ all(prenominal) during being fight II. This operation committed Germ any(prenominal) to fight removedgon a topst the Soviet compass north which it invaded on June 22, 1941 and alter on March of 1942. In the previous(predicate) stages of the military campaign, the Germans employed the comparable bilitzkrieg tactics that dish show upd them intumesce in the Hesperian campaigns.They were hoping to duplicate that aforementioned(prenominal) victory against the Soviets and were lulled into a false perceive of confidence when they covered a megabucks of ground and scored many victories which netted them piles of pris mavenrs of state of struggle. When 1942 came along, German high dominate began to turn up to later on how wrong they were and olibanum began a protracted state of warfare in what they came to call the eastern front. This operation was think to be the fulfillment of Hitlers vision of living space (living space) in his work on, Mein Kampf.If land was passiond in Europe, it could be sustained by and king-sized exclusively at the expense of Russia, and this meant that the parvenue Reich must again set itself on the defect along the road of the Teutonic Knights of old, to obtain by the German sword cover for the German plow and daily lollipop for the nation Destiny itself foreseems to wish to pane come in the way to us here(predicate) This colossal empire in the atomic number 99 is ripe for dissolution, and the end of the Jewish domination in Russia leave in any case be the end of Russia as a state. (cited in Shirer 124, 1044 Riasanovsky 515 Hitler)Politically, the clashing extremist ideologies of dickens Germany and the Soviet Union gave the Nazis all the same up untold impetus to invade Russia, considering it as a newfound crusade against communi sm which they believed was the creation of the Jews for whom Hitler and the Nazis could see no good. Furthermore, Hitler envisioned the Slavic lot as a race that would serve the purpose of the Aryan race by wither being their slaves or gasconade wherein they would provide them with something to hunt or cover thumbs run through to maintain their virility (Hitler).This was an opportunity for the Nazis to abrogate these enemies in one fell swoop, at a time and for all. The Spanish civil war of 1936 gave the Germans a taste of war against the communist where they level off went face to face against Soviet volunteers in this fallrgence (Riasanovsky 514-515). As Hitlers armies were annexing neighboring states as part of restoring Germanys glory and patrimony, Hitler began conducting diplomatic overtures as part of his strategy to keep potentiality adversaries at bay, notwithstanding for just a while and the Soviet Union was one of them.Thus began secret dipomatic maneuvers whi ch resulted in the non-aggression cartel amongst Germany and the Soviet Union prior to the trespass of Poland where the latter was invited to bind part in it. Furthermore, this pact served other purposes other than acquire time for Germany to flak Russia. Strategically, Germany need Russian soil to be able to stockpile resources to them followe the blockade of the sealanes by the Allies, in particular oil which was vital to Germanys war preservation and machinery (Shirer 821-822).Despite entering into these agreements, secret or otherwise, both Germany and the Soviet Union still harbored suspicions and animosities against apiece other, primarily overdue to irreconcilable differences in ideology where both sides represent the face-to-face of political extremes, fascism and communism. The Soviets too saw the pact as an alliance of convenience on their part as they began their own involution by invading the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as well as Finlan d, which was an ally of Germany in 1940.For the sake of keeping the peace with the Soviets, the Germans remained belowstood as their minor ally was attacked by the Soviets. Germany in addition mat up insecure when the Soviets in purpose(p) the Baltic states which they also felt was theirs owing to historical precedence and flush more concerned when the Soviets were also moving into romania, other German ally further heighten tensions between these two supposed affiliate tho it was rather apparent that conflict between them would be inevitable as both sides were taking advantage of separately other, with the Soviets being the commencement (Riasanovsky 517 Shirer 832-836, 883).The Nazis entered into a agreement with the Soviets as an alliance of convenience hoping to function more from the treaty. As the war was progressing in the west, the Germans were beginning to realize how difficult the Russians were as negotiants as the latter were driving precise hard bargains, oddly Stalin. It is revealed in arrived German government documents that Stalin also took part in negotiations and was a very tough negotiator who could not be pushed into a via media and always sought a amend deal for Russia and was very demanding.No amount of notion and even threats could deter the Russian tyrant (Shirer 882). The German war plan called for a one-front war in order to save and husband their resources. Though most of occidental Europe was not occupied, Great Britain remained defiant and continued to adjudge out in a protracted aerial skirmish over their originspace where they were able to enforce heavy casualties on the German Luftwaffe ( publicise force), on that pointby forestalling any plans for a seaborne onset by the Germans well into 1941.By 1941, Hitler began to compel impatient on how the campaign against the British was spill. It also did not help that Germany was also suffering an acute shortage of resources and this was what prompted Hit ler to stand the proverbial gun and attack Russia, sentiment also that the British would not devote him a problem as he decided to shelve the infringement of Britain and intrust it to his U-Boats to strangle Britain economically.By December of 1940, Hitler already had plans for the invasion from his generals and it was hoped that the attack would come out in the border of 1941. The plan was codenamed Barbarossa, after the Holy Roman emperor who was one of the co-leaders of the troika advertise an apt name for the operation since Hitler regarded this aforethought(ip) offensive as a new crusade and it also came at a time when relations between Berlin and not bad(p) of the Russian Federation were starting to turn sour as both sides appear to guts that they were double cross each other (Shirer 1045, 1049).Another reason for Hitlers desire to attack Russia the soonest was to seal Britains fate, go forth her with no ally when he verbalise But if Russia is smashed, Britains last hope go away be shattered. Then Germany will be master of Europe and the Balkans In lot of these considerations, Russia must be liquidated The sooner Russia is smashed, the better. (cited in Shirer 1047) Furthermore, Hitler also said that When Barbarossa commences, the world wil hold its breath and stupefy no comment. (cited in Shirer 1078) Hitler was apparently lulled into a false sense of confidence pull rounding(a) the victories of German forces in Poland and western Europe and he felt they could do it again in Russia which make him even more confident because he regarded the Russians as lowly despite their large population and their inferiority would make it short for Germany to defeat and conquer them. He was confident that he would succeed where forty winks had failed, by conquering Russia quickly and in the shortest brush of time possible.The rationale for this was to avoid the acetous Russian overwinter which was one of the reasons wherefore Napoleon fail ed and he would not need to make that same mistake Napoleon did. Furthermore, if the Russian campaign would drag on beyond winter, they also had to contend with the following spring where the snow-covered ground would turn muddy, which would play mayhem on their puissant war machines which they had never encountered in the western front.He was so driven and obsessed in attacking Russia that he disregarded the advice of his commanders to commence campaigns elsewhere by constantly stating Russia had to be make itd first and that everything else could wait. The plan called for a six-month time table but constant foot-dragging and waging campaigns in the Balkans and North Africa conditioned plans well into June of 1941 (Shirer 1087-1088). alongside the military planning, Hitler also spelled out his political plans for Russia once the invasion commenced in what became cognize as the Commissar Order. Hitler saw the war also as a skirmish of ideologies and he saw the need to elimina te those who propagate it when he stated The commissars are the bearers of ideologies directly opposed to National Socialism. consequently the commissars will be liquidated. German soldiers guilt-ridden of breaking international law will be excused. Russia has not participated in the Hague collection and therefore has no rights elaboratestairs(a) it. (cited in Shirer 1089) It can further be inferred here that Hitler was intent on deliberately committing finish up by ordering the systematic exercise of any political commissar captured by German forces.Most of Hitlers commanders objected to it. These were professional soldiers who knew that murder was not part of a soldiers duty and this would be something they would have to deal with when several of them would be brought to trial in Nuremberg in 1945 (Shirer 1089-1090). In an apparent display of overconfidence, Alfred Rosenberg, one of Hitlers lieutenants, prematurely made a proposal on how to divide Russia into political a dministrations, each with an disposed German name.The Baltic region and Belarus would be called Ostland the Ukraine, along with its adjacent areas Southern Russia tally along the Caucasus mountains would be called Kaukasus the areas surrounding Moscow, Moskau and Turkestan for the interchange regions, each ruled by the modern-day German version of the ancient Roman prefect. Furthermore, plans were already in motion on how to best exploit Russias resources. They intend to use it to feed Germanys industries and its tribe.They were acutely aware of the obstinate consequences it would have on the Russian people in footing of hunger but the Nazis could not care less on what would happen even if one million million millions of Russians would perish low their proposed policies (Shirwe 1091-1092). The forces Hitler arrayed against Russia was made up of one hundred seventy-five army divisions, supported by redoubted artillery and accouterments divisions, both from the Wehrmacht (regular army) and his elite group Waffen-SS. These were divided into collar army groups, North, nerve and South, each given specific objectives to capture.To the north, under the command of field of operation Marshal Wilhelmvon Leeb, the pose was Leningrad. As the citys name implies, it was named after Lenin, the adjudge father of the Russian Revolution which seasonably began in that city, then named Petrograd (St. Petersburg) and the Soviet Union and therefore, one of the symbolic targets of the German invasion forces. Historially, Hitler believed Leningrad was once part of the territory conquered by the Teutonic Knights of the Middle Ages and he was patently trying to take back what belonged to Germany by virtue of conquest (Salisbury 37).The center group, under Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, would head for the capital Moscow, reminiscent of Napoleons actions. The southern forces under Field Marshal Gert von Rundstedt would head for capital of the Ukraine and Rostov-on-Don in what is now part of the Ukraine which was the Soviet Unions agricultural heartland as well as the road to the oil-rich fields of the Caucasus and Black ocean area (Riasanovsky 518-519). Follow-on forces would come soon to do mop-up operations and to deal with any drumbeater or guerrilla activity in the occupied areas.All in all, the Nazi governing had already made grandiose plans on what to do with Russia, believing they would finally succeed where Napoleon had failed in addition to the occurrence that Russias conquest would be the fulfillment of Hitlers visions delimitate in Mein Kampf. On the part of the Soviets, they had the mathematical qualityity over the Germans with roughly 8 million men to the Germanys 4 million which also included its allies from Italy, Hungary, Finland and Romania.They even had ten times the number of artillery, armored vehicles and aircraft arrayed against the Germans as well. In terms of numbers, the Soviets were by no means weak. If there was o ne weakness of the chromatic Army, it was its transformation with men from the various Soviet republics and whose dispositions ranged from accommodative to hostile towards one another even before they face the Germans.Furthermore, majority of the Soviet forces initially arrayed were made up primarily of conscripts coming mainly from the peasantry, a throwback of the Tsarist era. The commissars were the ones who primarily kept them in line, not just to conserves ideological purity but meting out discipline instead of the officers assigned to the units and even tried to lead them, replacing the ones persecuted even though they lacked the qualifications. Communications and lead was also poor.This was partly Stalins fault during the Great throw away of the 1930s where several competent senior officers of the Red Army were victims of the purges, depriving their units of capable leaders. As a result, these units were routed with millions killed and taken prisoner (Parker 60). Over all command was under Field Marshal Georgi Zhukov who had rattling(a) himself in the far east in border clashes against the Japanese which gave him a constitution of being a successful commander.Countering the terce German offensive groups are triple military commissions tasked with forming the defense of their assigned territory and plunk a counteroffensive. They were the North-Western Direction under Colonel oecumenicals Markian Popov and Fyodor Kuznetsov which covers the Baltic region the Western Direction under General Dimitry Pavlov which covers the areas west of Moscow and the South-Western Direction under Generals Mikhail Kirponos and Ivan Tyulenev concentrating on the Ukraine (Parker 107 Riasanovsky 518).Despite having more war machines compared to the Germans, they were inferior in quality. The Soviets initially had the T-28 middling tanks which could not stand up to the supeior armor the Germans prepared the Panzer I-III series. Although the Soviets had quality arm or interchangeable the T-34 and KV-1, they were not abundant in number and were reserved for first-line units, particularly the elite Guards units.For air assets, once more, the quality of Soviet rubbish aircraft was inferior to ther Germans as they fielded the Poikarpov I-16, Lavochkin-3 and Mig-3 which were mediocre compared to the superior Bf109 fighter planes of the Luftwaffe which made short work of the Red Air Force which were on peacetime status, with aircraft parked closely together in the airfields, make them easy targets for high-altitude bombers and the dreaded Stuka dive bombers of the Luftwaffe (Batty).On the political front, even Stalin was aware of an threatening conflict with Germany and that the treaties they had would not last much longer as tensions between the two supposed allies were increasing as both sides began to sense the duplicity of the other. Yet, he refused to heed the warnings coming from intelligence agents in the field of an impending German atta ck and those who merely did their duty were branded as provocateurs and censured, if not arrested.He even ignored warnings from British and American emissaries who were aware of the dangers, thinking it was a ruse to make him show his strain prematurely and not wanting to make the mistake Nicholas II did in 1914. Stalin held impregnable power and did not permit any autonomy nor initiative among his subordinates (Salisbury 37). Although German aircraft hadalready been enter into Soviet airspace, Stalin gave orders not to meet or engage them.His hesitation proved pricy as it sent a means to the Germans that the Soviets were complacent, making it the ripe time to attack. The first phase of the war began with air strikes on let on military bases and cities to sow terror, dismay and confusion as well as cripple and hinder Soviet forces. By the end of the opening phase, the Lufwaffe enjoyed total air superiority over Soviet territory, making them virtually unopposed as they managed to pulverize a lot of Soviet aircraft on the ground and shoot congeal down those that managed to take off but were inferior in quality.This was followed up by a co-occurrent attack by all three German army groups in their several(prenominal) fronts and they were able to control the Soviets off guard, resulting in numerous Soviet casualties and prisoners. They would duplicate the same tactic they did in Poland wherein they would bypass heavier foe units and encircle them, cutting them off from any support and crush them. They would apply the same tactic as well on major Soviet cities, besieging them and famished their people although in the case of Leningrad, Hitler valued it destroyed (Riasanovsky 518 Salisbury 40).Surprisingly, they were happily welcomed by the civilian population in the Ukraine and the Baltic states who hated Stalin and his communist regime. For them, the Germans were liberators instead of invaders and this had helped the Germans gain a foothold into Sovi et territory (Batty). However, by the quaternaryth week of the campaign, the progress bogged down as the German forces were overextended and needed time to allow for support units to catch up. By the time they were able to be restored again, winter had set in.Even though it provided mobility due to hardened ground, the conditions were do dismal and German forces were beginning to understand now wherefore Napoleon failed as severe blizzards work havoc on the invaders who were unprepared for General Winter, the same foe Napoleon faced and had proven to be a far more formidable foe than any army the Germans had fought. At the same time, unobjectionable Soviet troops from the east were deployed and they fought tenaciously and with more determination, further slowing down the German advance.What had hoped to be finished in three to six months would run for four more years and would eventually hunt down German resources dry. The Soviets may have been brought down initially but they were not out of the running as they managed to recover and gravel stronger in the latter phase of the campaign. In conclusion, Operation Barbarossa started off well but in the middle, it began to lose steam and thusly forcing the Germans to fight a kind of war they did not want, especially against Russia which was a war of attrition.It was considered a failure because the Germans failed to meet their objectives of capturing the key cities and failed to meet their timetable, causing them to be caught up in a winter war they were ill-prepared for. This was attributed to the constant delay of the commencement of the attack. The delay caused them to be caught up by the winter season and Hitler refused to heed his generals advice for a give way to allow the winter to pass.Hitlers obsession for going on the offensive caused the German forces to be stretched too thin making the develop areas vulnerable to stay-behind forces and partisan attacks which tied down his forces. The dogged a nd tenacious resistance put up by the Soviets despite their inferior quality bought time for them to transfer their industries to the hostile regions beyond the Urals where they were safe from attacks or capture and enabled the Soviets to reconstitute their forces. Finally, they underestimated the capabilities of the Red Army, especially the Nazi leadership who looked down on the Slavs.Finally, the Germans fought a war they did not want, a 3-front campaign Western Europe, North Africa and Mediterranean and the easterly Front which severely divided their forces and resources, not to mention fighting multiple enemies, especially with the entry of the United States into the war. The Soviets too had their faults which nigh cost them the war, and Stalin was to blame for decimating his officer corps during the 1930 purges. His iron will of not permitting strike out also caused numerous casualties and prisoners as his commissars and trustworthy commanders blindly followed his orders.Hi s saving grace was the leadership in the front provided by Zhukov who vigorously went around Stalins orders to husband his forces that enabled them to recover and recover lost ground in the subsequent battles owing to the characteristic resilience of the Russian forces, interspersed with patriotic fervor. The Soviets ay have lost the initial battles but they eventually won the war because of this and eventually took the war to the Germans and visited upon them the same havoc they wrought upon them. Works Cited Barbarossa (June-December 1941). The World at War. Writ. Peter Batty. Thames. 1973.Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Hitler. Org. 1924. Retrieved 17 May 2010 <http//www. hitler. org/ literature/Mein_Kampf/>. Parker, Robert Alexander Clarke. The Second World War A Short memorial. Oxford Oxford University Press, 2001. Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. A History of Russia. smart York Oxford University Press, 1984. Salisbury, Harrison E. The 900 Days The Siege of Leningrad. unbent Stor ies of World War II . Ed. Nancy J. Sparks. Pleasantville, New York The Readers Digest Association, Inc. , 1969. 35-63. Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York Simon and Schuster, 1960.